Review sites have become increasingly important sources of information for consumers. Because these reviews affect sales, businesses have the incentive to game the system by leaving positive reviews for themselves, or negative reviews their competitors. Such review fraud undermines the trustworthiness of consumer reviews, and constitutes a major risk factor for review sites. In this paper, we investigate review fraud on the popular consumer review site Yelp. We construct a novel data set to analyze this problem, combining restaurant reviews with Yelp's algorithmic indicator of fake reviews. Using this imperfect indicator as a proxy, we develop an empirical methodology to identify the points in the life-cycle of a business during which review fraud is most prevalent. We find that a restaurant's changing reputation affects its decision to engage in review fraud. Specifically, a restaurant is more likely to seek a positive fake review when its reputation is weak, i.e., when it has few reviews, or it has recently received bad reviews. Consistent with theory, we find that chains are less likely than independent restaurants to engage in review fraud. We then turn our attention to negative review fraud, and find that increased competition by similar restaurants the driving force behind it. † Part of this work was completed while the author was supported by a Simons Foundation Postdoctoral Fellowship.
Introduction
Review fraud is the preeminent threat to the sustainability of the online consumer review ecosystem. When businesses game the system by leaving favorable reviews for themselves, or unfavorable reviews for their competitors, they undermine its trustworthiness. Review sites like Yelp, TripAdvisor, and Angie's List, which have become increasingly popular over the past decade, and now exist for nearly any product or service imaginable, acknowledge these illegitimate actions as major risk factors in their business models. For example, in its recent Form S-1 filing with the SEC, Yelp warned potential investors that the success of the company depends, among other things, on its ability to "continue to earn and preserve a reputation for providing meaningful and reliable reviews of local businesses."
There is considerable anecdotal evidence that cheating is endemic in the industry. For example, the New York Times recently reported on the case of businesses hiring workers on Mechanical Turkan Amazon-owned crowdsourcing marketplace -to post fake 5-star Yelp reviews on their behalf for as little as 25 cents apiece. 1 In 2004, Amazon.ca unintentionally revealed the identities of "anonymous" reviewers, briefly unmasking considerable self-reviewing by book authors. 2 Review fraud is exacerbated by the direct influence reviews can have on product sales (for example, see Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006) , Zhu and Zhang (2010) , Luca (2011) ), their low production cost, the inherent difficulties in detecting fake reviews which are expertly crafted to masquerade as honest ones, and the immaterial consequences currently faced by cheaters who are caught.
Despite the growing incidence of review fraud, and the major risks it poses for firms and consumers alike, little is known about the economic incentives behind it. In this paper, we assemble a novel dataset from Yelp -one of the industry leaders -and we use it to estimate the incidence of review fraud among restaurants in the Boston metropolitan area, and to understand the circumstances under which it is most prevalent. Specifically, we provide evidence on the association between a restaurants' evolving reputation, the varying intensity of competition it faces, and its propensity to engage in positive and negative review fraud.
The main challenge in empirically identifying review fraud is that we not directly observe whether a review is fake. The situation is further complicated by the lack of single standard for what makes review "fake". The Federal Trade Commission's truth-in-advertising rules 3 provide some useful guidelines: reviews must be "truthful and substantiated", non-deceptive, and any material connection between the reviewer and the business being reviewed must be disclosed. For example, reviews by the business owner, his or her family members, competitors, reviewers that have been compensated, or a disgruntled ex-employee are considered fake (and, by extension illegal) unless these connections are disclosed. Not every review can be as unambiguously classified. The case of a business owner "nudging" consumers by providing them with instructions on how to review his business is in a legal grey area. It is an interesting question to what extent such interventions can skew the distribution of a business' ratings. Their effectiveness notwithstanding, most review sites -whose objective is to collect reviews that are as objective as possible -frown upon such interventions, and encourage business owners to avoid them.
To work around the limitation of not observing fake reviews we exploit a unique Yelp feature:
Yelp is the only major review site we know of that allows access to filtered reviews -reviews that Yelp has classified as illegitimate using a combination of algorithmic techniques, simple heuristics, and human expertise. Filtered reviews are not published on Yelp's main listings, and they do not count towards calculating a business' average star-rating. Nevertheless, a determined Yelp visitor can see a business' filtered reviews after solving a puzzle known as a CAPTCHA. 4 Filtered reviews are, of course, only imperfect indicators of fake reviews. Our work contributes to the literature on review fraud by developing a method that uses an imperfect indicator of fake reviews to empirically identify the circumstances under which fraud is prevalent. This technique translates to other settings where such an imperfect indicator is available, and relies on the following assumption: that the proportion of fake reviews is strictly smaller among the reviews Yelp publishes, than the reviews Yelp filters. We consider this to be a modest assumption whose validity can be qualitatively evaluated. In § 4, we formalize the assumption, suggest a method of evaluating its validity, and use it to develop our empirical methodology for identifying the incentives of review fraud.
3 See "Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising", available at http://ftc. gov/os/2009/10/091005revisedendorsementguides.pdf.
4 A CAPTCHA is a puzzle originally designed to distinguish humans from machines. It is commonly implemented by asking users to accurately transcribe a piece of text that has been intentionally blurred -a task that is easier for humans than for machines. Yelp uses CAPTCHAs to make access to filtered reviews harder for both humans and machines. For more on CAPTCHAs see Von Ahn et al. (2003) .
Summary of results
Overall, roughly 16% of all reviews in our dataset are filtered by Yelp. What does a filtered review look like? We first consider the distribution of star-ratings. We find that the ratings of filtered reviews are more extreme than published reviews. This observation relates to a broader literature studying the distribution of consumer reviews' ratings (for example, see Li and Hitt (2008) .) Existing work has largely attributed the often-observed bimodal distributions of ratings to reviewer self-selection. We advance the hypothesis that part of the reason that we often see a disproportionate amount of extreme reviews is because these reviews are fake. We also find that filtered reviews tend to be shorter, and that their authors have written few other Yelp reviews.
Finally, we check whether Yelp tunes its filter to favor advertisers, and provide some preliminary evidence against this hypothesis.
We then turn our attention to analyzing the economic incentives for a restaurant to solicit, or leave, a positive fake review for itself. Theoretically, a restaurant's existing reputation should affect its decision to seek a fake review -restaurants with worse, or less established reputations have a stronger incentive to game the system. Consistent with this, we find that a restaurant's reputation is a strong predictor of its decision to leave a fake review. We also find that restaurants are more likely to engage in fraud when they have fewer reviews. This result motivates an additional explanation for the often-observed concentration of high ratings earlier in a business' life-cycle. Previous work attributed this concentration to interactions between a consumer's decision to contribute a review, and prior reviews by other consumers (see Moe and Schweidel (2012) , Godes and Silva (2012) .) Our work suggests businesses' increased incentives to manipulate their reviews early on as an additional explanation for this observation. We also find that restaurants that have recently received bad ratings engage in more positive review fraud. By contrast, we find no link between negative review fraud and reputation. To some extent this is to be expected, since these are fake reviews that are presumably left by a business' competitors.
We also find that a restaurant's "offline" reputation is a determinant of its decision to seek positive fake reviews. In particular, Luca (2011) finds that consumer reviews are less influential for chain restaurants, which already have firmly established reputations built by extensive marketing and branding. Jin and Leslie (2009) find that organizational form also affects a restaurant's per-formance in hygiene inspections. Consistent with this, we find that chain restaurants are less likely to leave fake reviews relative to independent restaurants. This contributes to our understanding of the ways in which a business' reputation affects its incentives with respect to review fraud.
Finally, we turn our attention to the effect of competition on negative review fraud. We find that increased competition by nearby independent restaurants serving similar types of food is positively associated with negative review fraud. Interestingly, increased competition by nearby restaurants serving different types of food are not a significant predictor of negative review fraud. A potential explanation for this finding is that restaurants, except for location, also compete on cuisine. This explanation echoes the survey of Auty (1992) in which diners ranked food type and quality highest among a list of restaurant selection criteria, suggesting that restaurants do no compete on the basis of location alone. Our results are also consistent with the analysis of Mayzlin et al. (2012) who find that hotels with independently-owned neighbors are more likely to receive negative fake reviews.
Overall, our findings suggest that positive review fraud is primarily driven by changes in a restaurant's own reputation, while negative review fraud is primarily driven by changing patterns of competition. For platforms looking to curtail gaming, our results provide insights both into the extent of gaming, as well as the circumstances in which this is more prevalent.
Related work
Our paper is related to the growing literature on consumer reviews. Many of these papers investigate the impact of reviews on demand for products and services (Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006 ), Luca (2011 ), Ghose et al. (2012 , Anderson and Magruder (2012) ). Given this influence, there has been increasing interest in understanding how reviews are generated, and the quality of the information they provide. Li and Hitt (2008) theoretically and empirically show that the time trend of reviews is affected by self-selection -early consumers may have different preferences relative to late consumers. Dai et al. (2012) adjust and reweigh ratings based on estimated informational content. Looking at movie sales and reviews, Dellarocas et al. (2010) provide evidence that consumers are more likely to review niche products, but at the same time are more likely to leave a review if many other reviewers have contributed. Ghose et al. (2012) incorporate reviews into a demand estimation model, to improve the value of information provided to consumers.
Several papers explicitly pertain to fake reviews, and more generally to gaming of online reviews. Dellarocas (2006) theoretically analyzes strategic fraud of reviews, and provides conditions under which reviews can still be informative even if there is gaming. Within computer science, a growing literature has focused on the development of machine learning algorithms to identify review fraud.
Commonly these algorithms rely either on data mining techniques to identify abnormal reviewing patterns, or employ supervised learning methods trained on hand-labelled examples. Some examples are Ott et al. (2012 ), Feng et al. (2012 , Akoglu et al. (2013) , Mukherjee et al. (2011 Mukherjee et al. ( , 2012 , Jindal et al. (2010) .
To the best of our knowledge, there exists only one other paper that analyzes the economic incentives of review fraud, and uses a different empirical approach and setting. Mayzlin et al. (2012) exploit an organizational difference between Expedia and TripAdvisor, coincidentally both spin-offs of the same parent company, 5 to study review fraud by hotels: while anyone can post a review on TripAdvisor, Expedia requires that a guest has "paid and stayed" before submitting a review. The authors observe that Expedia's verification mechanism increases the cost of posting a fake review. Motivated by this observation, they first classify reviews as positive, or negative according to their star-rating, and then construct a fraud measure by taking the cross-site differences in the percentages of positive (or, negative) reviews. The validity of this measure rests on an implicit assumption: differences in the distributions of ratings across the two sites are either due to review fraud, or due to confounding factors that can be controlled for. However, differences in the proprietary technologies Expedia and TripAdvisor use to identify and remove fake content constitute one such set of unobserved confounders that are difficult to control for. For example, while Mayzlin et al. (2012) having its fake reviews removed. 8 Another potentially confounding factor is Expedia's policy of distinguishing between "ratings-only reviews", and "text reviews" and publishing in individual form only the latter. Ratings-only reviews, while equally legitimate in that they are also supplied by verified travelers, are only used in aggregate form towards the calculation of average star-ratings.
The analysis in Mayzlin et al. (2012) implicitly assumes that the distribution of ratings is not significantly different for ratings-only and text reviews.
In this work, we eschew the problem of biases arising due to unobserved cross-organizational differences, by studying reviews within a single organization. Furthermore, by incorporating in our analysis the complete set of reviews posted on Yelp, including those that Yelp does not publish, we can control for potential systematic biases introduced by Yelp's filtering algorithm. Finally, in contrast to the cross-sectional analysis undertaken by Mayzlin et al. (2012) , we exploit the panel nature of our dataset to study differences in review fraud both between and within businesses. This enables us to study the changing incentives of review fraud over a business' life-cycle.
Finally, we briefly mention the loose connection between our work, the literature on statistical fraud detection (e.g., see Bolton and Hand (2002) ), and the related line of research on statistical models of misclassification in binary data (e.g., see Hausman et al. (1998) ). These methods have been applied to uncover various types of fraud, such as fraudelent insurance claims, and fraudelent credit card transactions. The key difference of our work is that our end goal isn't to identify individual fraudelent reviews -instead we wish exploit a noisy signal of review fraud to investigate the incentives behing it.
Data

About Yelp
Our analysis investigates reviews from the website Yelp.com, which is a consumer review platform where users can review local businesses such as restaurants, bars, hair salons, and many other services. At the time of this study, Yelp receives approximately 100 million unique visitors per month, and counts over 30 million reviews in its collection. It is the dominant review site for restaurants. For these reasons, Yelp is a compelling setting in which to investigate review fraud.
For a more detailed description of Yelp in general, see Luca (2011) .
In this analysis, we focus on restaurant reviews in the metropolitan area of Boston, MA. We include in our analysis every Yelp review that was written from the founding of Yelp in 2004 through 2012, other than the roughly 1% of reviews that violate Yelp's terms of service (for example, reviews that contain offensive, or discriminatory language.) In total, our dataset contains 316,415 reviews for 3,625 restaurants. Of these reviews, 50,486 (approximately 16%) have been filtered by Yelp.
Figure 1a displays quarterly totals of published and filtered reviews on Yelp. Both Yelp's growth in terms of the number of reviews that are posted on it, and the increasing number of reviews that are filtered are evident in this figure.
Characteristics of filtered reviews
To the extent that Yelp is a content aggregator rather than a content creator, there is a direct interest in understanding reviews that Yelp has filtered. While Yelp purposely makes the filtering algorithm hard to reverse engineer, we are able to test for differences in the observed attributes of published and filtered reviews. Yelp's retroactively filters reviews using the latest version of its detection algorithm. Therefore, a Yelp review can be initially filtered, but subsequently published (and vice versa.) Hence, the increasing trend seems to reflect the growing incentives for businesses to leave fake reviews as Yelp grows in influence, rather than improvements in Yelp's fake-review detection technology.
Should we expect the distribution of ratings for a given restaurant to reflect the unbiased distribution of consumer opinions? The answer to this question is likely no. Empirically, Hu et al. (2006) show that reviews on Amazon are highly dispersed, and in fact often bimodal (roughly 50% of products on Amazon have a bimodal distribution of ratings). Theoretically, Li and Hitt (2008) point to the fact that people choose which products to review, and may be more likely to rate products after having an extremely good or bad experience. This would lead reviews to be more dispersed than actual consumer opinion. This selection of consumers can undermine the quality of information that consumers receive from reviews.
We argue that fake reviews may also contribute to the large dispersion that is often observed in consumer ratings. To see why, consider what a fake review might look like: fake reviews may consist of a business leaving favorable reviews for itself, or unfavorable reviews for its competitors. There is little incentive for a business to leave a mediocre review. Hence, the distribution of fake reviews should tend to be more extreme than that of legitimate reviews. Figure 2a shows the distributions of published and filtered review on Yelp. The contrast between the two distributions is consistent with these predictions. Legitimate reviews are unimodal with a sharp peak at 4 stars. By contrast, the distribution of fake reviews is bimodal with spikes at 1 star and 5 stars. Hence, in this context, fake reviews appear to exacerbate the dispersion that is often observed in online consumer ratings.
In Figure 2b we break down individual reviews by the total number of reviews their authors have written, and display the percentage of filtered reviews for each group. The trend we observe suggests that Yelp users who have contributed more reviews are less likely to have their reviews filtered.
We estimate the characteristics of filtered reviews in more detail by using the following linear probability model:
where the dependent variable Filtered ij indicates whether the j th review of business i was filtered, b i is a business fixed effect, and x ij is vector of review and reviewer characteristics including: star rating, (log of) length in characters, (log of) total number of reviewer reviews, and a dummy for the reviewer having a Yelp-profile picture. The estimation results are shown in the first column of Table 1 . In line with our observations so far, we find that reviews with extreme ratings are more likely to be filtered -all else equal, 1-and 5-star review are roughly 3 percentage points more likely to be filtered than 3-star reviews. We also find that Yelp's review filter is sensitive to the review and reviewer attributes included in our model. Our most striking finding is that reviews by users missing a Yelp profile picture are 41 percentage points more likely to be filtered than those associate with a picture. Longer reviews, or reviews by users with a larger review count are less likely to be filtered.
Beyond establishing some characteristics of Yelp's filter, this analysis also points to the need for controlling for potential algorithmic biases when using filtered reviews as a proxy for fake reviews.
We explain our approach in dealing with this issue in § 4.
Filtered Reviews and Advertising on Yelp
Local business advertising constitutes Yelp's major revenue stream. Advertisers are featured on
Yelp search results pages in response to relevant consumer queries, and on the Yelp pages of similar, nearby businesses. Furthermore, when a business purchases advertising, Yelp removes competitors' ads from that business' Yelp page. Over the years, Yelp has been the target of repeated complaints alleging that its filter discriminates in favor of advertisers, going in some cases as far as claiming that the filter is nothing other than an extortion mechanism for advertising revenue. 9 Yelp has denied these allegations, and successfully defended itself in court when lawsuits have been brought against it (for example, see Levitt v. Yelp Inc., and Demetriades v. Yelp Inc.) If such allegations were true, they would raise serious concerns as to the validity of using filtered reviews as proxy for fake reviews in our analysis.
Using our dataset we are able to cast further light on this issue. To do so we exploit the fact that Yelp publicly discloses which businesses are current advertisers (it does not disclose which businesses were advertisers historically.) Specifically, we augment Equation 1 by interacting the x it variables with a dummy variable indicating whether a business was a Yelp advertiser at the time we obtained our dataset. The results of estimating this model are shown in second column of Table 1 . We find that none of the advertiser interaction effects are statistically significant, while the remaining coefficients are essentially unchanged in comparison to those in Equation 1. This suggests, for example, that neither 1-nor 5-star reviews were significantly more or less likely to be filtered for businesses that were advertising on Yelp at the time we collected our dataset.
This analysis has some clear limitations. First, since we do not observe the complete historic record of which businesses have advertised on Yelp, we can only test for discrimination in favor of (or, against) current Yelp advertisers. Second, we can only test for discrimination in the present breakdown between filtered and published reviews. Third, our test obviously possesses no power whatsoever in detecting discrimination unrelated to filtering decisions. Therefore, while our analysis provides some suggestive evidence against the theory that Yelp favors advertisers, we stress that it is neither exhaustive, nor conclusive. It is beyond the scope of this paper, and outside the capacity of our dataset to evaluate all the ways in which Yelp could favor advertisers.
Empirically Identifying Review Fraud Incentives
In this section we present our main identifying assumption, provide some supporting evidence for it, and suggest a subjective measure of its truth. Next, we exploit this assumption to build our empirical strategy for indentifying review fraud incentives. Finally, we incorporate in our model controls for potential algorithmic biases in Yelp's review filter.
4.1 Assumption: fake reviews are more likely to be filtered
The main assumption underlying our analysis is that the filter possesses some positive predictive power in distinguishing fake reviews from genuine ones. Recall that, the need for this assumption arises from the fact that we do not directly observe which reviews are fake -this is often the case in studies of gaming and corruption (e.g., see Mayzlin et al. (2012) , Duggan and Levitt (2002) , and references therein.) Formally, we assume that Pr[Filtered|¬Fake] = a 0 , and Pr[Filtered|Fake] = a 0 + a 1 , for constants a 0 ∈ [0, 1], and a 1 ∈ (0, 1], i.e., that the probability a fake review is filtered is strictly greater than the probability a genuine review is filtered.
Is this a credible assumption to make? Yelp's appears to espouse the view that it is. While Yelp is secretive about how its review filter works, it states that "the filter sometimes affects perfectly legitimate reviews and misses some fake ones, too", but "does a good job given the sheer volume of reviews and the difficulty of its task." 10 In addition, we suggest a subjective test to assess the assumption's validity: for any business, one can qualitatively check whether the fraction of suspicious-looking reviews is larger among the reviews Yelp publishes, rather than among the ones it filters. This test is equivalent to a test of our main assumption. To see this, notice that it involves evaluating the inequality
By Bayes' rule, the left-hand side is equal to
Similarly, the right-hand side is equal to
Substituting Equations 3 & 4 into Equation 2, and after some mechanical calculations, we obtain:
which is true, if and only if our initial assumption that a 1 > 0 holds. 11 A immediate corollary of rejecting the validity of our main assumption is that Yelp could reduce the fraction of fake of reviews among the reviews it publishes by not using the filter at all, and publishing any review that is submitted. Given our own experience with Yelp we believe the likelihood of this to be small.
To summarize, while relying on such an assumption is a clear limitation of work, we think it is a modest one to make, and without it, it would be difficult to study the important issue of review fraud.
Regression model
Now, we are ready to present our empirical strategy for identifying review fraud on Yelp. Ideally, if we could recognize fake reviews, we would estimate the following regression model:
where f it is the number of fake reviews business i received during period t, x it is a vector of timevarying covariates measuring a business' economic incentives to engage in review fraud, β are the structural parameters of interest, b i and τ t are business and time fixed effects, and the it is an error term. The inclusion of business fixed effects allows us to control for unobservable time-invariant, business-specific incentives for Yelp review fraud. For example, Mayzlin et al. (2012) find that the management structure of hotels in their study is associated with review fraud. To the extent that management structure is time-invariant, business fixed effects allow us to control for this unobservable characteristic. Hence, when looking at incentives to leave fake reviewers over time,
we include restaurant fixed effects. However, we also run specifications without a restaurant fixed
effect so that we can analyze time-invariant characteristics as well. Similarly, the inclusion of time fixed effects allows us to control for unobservable, common across businesses, time-varying shocks.
Since we do not directly observe f it we cannot estimate the parameters of this model. To proceed, we invoke our main assumption which implies that the probability that a review is filtered is given by 
Now, consider a business i which in period t received a total of n it reviews (genuine, and real.) Let y it denote the number of reviews, out of the n it submitted, that have been filtered by Yelp. Then, we have
Substituting Equation 6 into the above, yields the following model
It consists of observed quantities, unobserved fixed effects, and an error term. We can estimate this model using a within estimator which wipes out the fixed effects. However, while we can identify the reduced-form parameters a 1 β, we cannot separately identify the vector of structural parameters of interest, β. Therefore, we can only test for the presence of fraud through the estimates of the reduced-form parameters, a 1 β. Furthermore, since a 1 ≤ 1, these estimates will be lower bounds to the structural parameters, β.
Controlling for biases in Yelp's filter
So far, we have not accounted for possible biases in Yelp's filter related to specific review attributes.
For example, the filter may be more likely to filter shorter reviews, regardless of whether they are fake. To some extent, we can control for these biases. Let z be a vector of review and reviewer attributes. We incorporate filter biases in our model by taking the probability of a review being filtered to be
Following the same steps as above, we obtain the following expression for the number of filtered reviews
This in turn suggests the following regression model
where z itj stands for the attributes of the j th review of business i at time t. In z itj , we include controls for: review length, the number of prior reviews a review's author has written, and whether the reviewer has a profile picture associated with his or her account. As we saw in § 3 these attributes help explain a large fraction of the variance in filtering. A limitation of our work is that we cannot control for filtering biases in attributes that we do not observe, such as the IP address of a reviewer, or the exact time a review was submitted. If these unobserved attributes are endogenous, our estimation will be biased. Equation 12 constitutes our main specification.
Review Fraud and Own Reputation
This section discusses the main results, which are at the restaurant-month level and presented in Tables 3 and 4 . The particular choice of aggregation granularity is driven by the frequency of reviewing activity. Restaurants in the Boston area receive on average approximately 0.1 1-star published reviews per month, and 0.37 5-star reviews. Table 2 contains detailed summary statistics of the these variables.
We focus on understanding the relationship between a restaurant's reputation and the its in-centives to leave a fake review, with the overarching hypothesis that restaurants with a more established, or more favorable reputation have less of an incentive to leave fake reviews. While there isn't a single variable that fully captures a restaurant's reputation, there are several that we feel comfortable analyzing, including its number of recent positive and negative reviews, and an indicator for whether the restaurant is a chain, or independent business. These are empirically well-founded metrics of a restaurant's reputation.
Specifically, we estimate Equation 12
, where we include in the vector x it the following parameters: the number of 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 star reviews received in period t − 1; the log of the total number of reviews the business had received up to and including period t − 1; and, the age of the business in period t measured in (fractional) years. To investigate the incentives of positive review fraud we estimate specifications with the number of 5-star reviews per restaurant-month as the dependent variable. These results are presented in Table 3 . Similarly, to investigate negative review fraud,
we repeat the analysis with the number of 1-star reviews per restaurant-month as the dependent variable. We present these results in Table 4 . Next, we discuss our results in detail.
Results: worsening reputation drives positive review fraud
Low ratings increase incentives for positive review fraud, and high ratings decrease them One measure of a restaurant's reputation is its rating. As a restaurant's rating increases, it receives more business Luca (2011) and hence may have less incentive to game the system.
Consistent with this hypothesis, we observe a positive and significant association between the number of published 1-and 2-star reviews a business received in period t − 1, and review fraud in period t. Conversely, we observe a negative, statistically significant association between review fraud in the current period, and the occurrence of 4-and 5-star published reviews in the previous period. In other words, a positive change to a restaurant's reputation -whether the result of legitimate, or fake reviews -reduces the incentives of engaging in review fraud.
Beyond the statistical significance of these results we also interested in their substantive economic impact. One way to gauge this, is to compare the mangitudes of the estimated coefficients to the average value of the dependent variable. For example, on average restaurants in our dataset received approximate 0.1 filtered 5-star reviews per month. Meanwhile, the coefficient estimates in the first column of Table 3 suggest that an additional 1-star review published in the previous period is associated with an extra 0.01 filtered 5-star reviews in the current period, i.e., an increase constituting approximately 10% of the observed monthly average. Futhermore, recalling that most likely a 1 < 1, this back of the envelope calculation is not a point estimate for the increase in fake 5-star reviews but rather a lower bound for it. (Alternatively, this can be interpreted as a point estimate of the increase in fake 5-star reviews that are also identified as such by Yelp, and are subsequently filtered.)
Having more reviews reduces incentives for positive review fraud As a restaurant receives more reviews, the benefit to each additional review decreases. First, if a business is looking to manipulate its average rating, then the impact of an additional review is higher when the business has a small number of reviews. Theoretically, the impact of the n th review on the average rating of business is O(1/n). Second, to the extent that the number of reviews a that business has signals quality, we would expect that the marginal benefit of an additional review to be lower for well-reviewed businesses. Hence, we expect restaurants to have stronger incentives to submit fake reviews when they have relatively few reviews. To test this hypothesis we include the logarithm of the current number of reviews a restaurant has in our model. Consistent with this, we find that there exists a negative, statistically significant association between the total number of reviews a business has received up to previous time period, and the intensity of review fraud during the current.
Chain restaurants leave fewer positive fake reviews Chain affiliation is an important source of a restaurant's reputation. Local and independent restaurants tend to be less well-known that national chains (defined in this paper as those with 15 or more nationwide outlets). Because of this, chains have substantially different reputational incentives than independent restaurants. In fact, Jin and Leslie (2009) find that chain restaurants maintain higher standards of hygiene as a consequence of facing stronger reputational incentives. Luca (2011) finds that the revenues of chain restaurants are not significantly affected by changes in their Yelp ratings since chains tend to rely heavily on other forms of promotion and branding to establish their reputation. Hence, chains have less to gain from review fraud.
In order to test this hypothesis, we exclude restaurant fixed effects, since they prevent us from identifying chain effects (or, any other time-invariant effect for this matter.) Instead, we implement a random effects (RE) design. One unappealing, assumption underlying the RE estimator is the orthogonality between observed variables and unobserved time-invariant restaurant characteristics,
i.e., that E[x it b i ] = 0. To address this issue, we follow the approach proposed by Mundlak (1978) , which allows for (a specific form) correlation between observables and unobservables. Specifically, we assume that b i =x i γ + ζ i , and we implement this correction by incorporating the group means of time-variant variables in our model. Empirically, we find that chain restaurants are less likely to engage in review fraud. The estimates of the time-varying covariates in model remain essentially unchanged compared to the fixed effects specification in the first column of Table 3 suggesting, as Mundlak (1978) highlights, that the RE model we estimate is properly specified.
Other determinants of positive review fraud Businesses can claim their pages on Yelp after undergoing a verification process. Once a business page has been claimed, its owner can respond to consumer reviews publicly or in private, add pictures and information about the business (e.g.
opening hours, and menus), and monitor the number of visitors to the business' Yelp page. 1,964 of all restaurants had claimed their listings by the time we collected our dataset. While we do not observe when these listings were claimed, we expect that businesses with a stronger interest in their Yelp presence, as signaled by claiming their pages, will engage in more review fraud.
To test this hypothesis, we estimate the same random effects model as in the previous section with one additional time-invariant dummy variable indicating whether a restaurant's Yelp page has been claimed or not. The results are shown in the third column of Table 3 . In line with our hypothesis, we find that businesses with claimed pages are significantly more likely to post fake 5-star reviews. While this finding doesn't fit into our reputational framework, we view it as an additional credibility check that enhances the robustness our analysis.
Negative review fraud Table 4 repeats our analysis with filtered 1-star reviews as the dependent variable. The situations in which we expect negative fake reviews to be most prevalent are qualitatively different from the situations in which we expect positive fake reviews to be most prevalent. Negative fake reviews are likely left by competitors (see Mayzlin et al. (2012) ), and may be subject to different incentives (for example, based on the proximity of competitors.) We have seen that positive fake reviews are more prevalent when a restaurant's reputation has deteriorated or is less established. In contrast, our results show that negative fake reviews are less responsive to a restaurant's recent ratings, but are still responsive -albeit to a lesser degree -to the number of reviews that have been left. In other words, while a restaurant is more likely to leave a favorable review for itself as its reputation deteriorates, this does not drive competitors to leave negative reviews. At the same time, both types of fake reviews are more prevalent when a restaurant's reputation is less established, i.e. when it has fewer reviews.
As additional credibility checks, we estimate the same RE models as above, which include chain affiliation, and whether a restaurant has claimed it's Yelp page as dummy variables. A priori we expect no association between either of these two indicators, and the number of negative fake review a business attracts from its competitors. A restaurant cannot deter its competitors from manipulating its reviews by being part of chain, or claiming its Yelp page. Indeed, our results, shown in columns 2 & 3 or Table 4 , indicate that neither effect is significant, confirming our hypothesis.
Review Fraud and Competition
We next turn our attention to analyzing the impact of competition on review fraud. The prevailing viewpoint on negative fake reviews is that they are left by a restaurant's competitors to tarnish its reputation, while we have no similar prediction about the relationship between positive fake reviews and competition.
Quantifying competition between restaurants
To identify the effect of competition on review fraud we exploit the fact that the restaurant industry has a relatively high attrition rate. While anecdotal and published estimates of restaurant failure rates vary widely, most reported estimates are high enough to suggest that over its a lifetime an individual restaurant will experience competition of varying intensity. In a recent study, Parsa et al. (2005) put the one-year survival probability of restaurants in Columbus, OH at approximately 75%, while an American Express study cited by the same authors estimates it at just about 10%. At the time we collected our dataset, 17% of all restaurants were identified by Yelp as closed.
To identify a restaurant's competitors, we have to consider which restaurant characteristics drive diners' decisions. While location is intuitively one of the factors driving restaurant choice, Auty (1992) finds that food type and quality rank higher in the list of consumers' selection criteria, and therefore restaurants are also likely to compete on the basis of these attributes. These observations, in addition to the varying incentives faced by chains, motivate a break down of competition by chain affiliation, food type, and proximity. To determine whether two restaurants are of the same type we exploit Yelp's fine-grained restaurant categorization. On Yelp, each restaurant is associated with up to three categories (such as Cambodian, Buffets, Gluten-Free, etc.) If two restaurants share at least one Yelp category, we deem them to be of the same type.
Next, we need to address the issue of spatial competition. One straightforward heuristic involves defining all restaurants within a fixed threshold distance of each other as competitors. This approach is implemented by Mayzlin et al. (2012) who define two hotels as competitors if they are located with half a kilometer of each other. Bollinger et al. (2010) employ the same heuristic to identify pairs of competing Starbucks and Dunkin Donuts. However, this simple rule may not be as well-suited to defining competition among restaurants. On one hand, location is likely a more important criterion for travelers than for diners. This suggests using a larger threshold to define restaurant competition. On the other hand, the geographic density of restaurants is much higher than that of hotels, or that of Starbucks and Dunkin Donuts branches. 12 Therefore, even a low threshold might cast too wide a net. For example, applying a half kilometer cutoff to our dataset results, on average, to approximately 67 competitors per restaurant. Mayzlin et al. (2012) deal with this issue by excluding the 25 largest (and presumably highest hotel-density) US cities from their analysis. Finally, it is likely that our results will be more sensitive to a particular choice of threshold given that restaurants are closer to each other than hotels. Checking the robustness of our results against too many different threshold values raises the concern of multiple hypothesis testing. Taken together these observations suggest that a single, sharp threshold rule might not adequately capture the competitive landscape in our setting.
In response to these concerns, a natural alternative is to weigh competitors by their distance.
Distance-based heuristics can be generalized using the idea smoothing kernel weights. Specifically, 12 Yelp reports 256 hotels in the Boston area compared to almost four thousand restaurants.
where d ij is the distance between the two restaurants, K is a kernel function, and h is positive parameter called the kernel bandwidth. Note that weights are symmetric, i.e., w ij = w ji . Then, depending on the choice of K and h, w ij provides different ways to capture the relationship between distance and competition. For example, the threshold heuristic can be implemented using a uniform kernel:
where 1 {...} is the indicator function. Using a bandwidth of h, K U assigns unit weights to competitors within a distance of h, and zero to competitors located farther. 13
Similarly, we can define the Gaussian kernel:
past the date of its last review. Then any negative fake reviews its competitors received between its miscalculated closing date and its true closing date cannot be attributed to competition. We acknowledge, but consider unlikely, the possibility that restaurants sharply change the rate at which they manipulate reviews during periods we misidentify them as being closed. In this case, measurement error can introduce bias in either direction when estimating competition effects.
Putting together all of the above pieces we can now operationalize the competition faced by restaurant i. Let w it be a four-dimensional vector whose first element measures competition by independent restaurants of the same type:
The indicator functions successively denote whether j is an independent restaurant, whether i and j share a Yelp category, and whether j is operating at time t. We define the remaining three elements of w it capturing the impact of different type independent restaurants, and same and different type chains in a similar manner.
Results: competition encourages negative review fraud
We now estimate the impact of competition on review fraud by augmenting our base model of Equation 12 with the vector w it , a set of four time-varying variables measuring competition intensity for restaurant i at time t:
As before we employ a fixed-effects estimator to rule out any time-invariant endogenous effects. We are especially concerned by purely spatial endogeneity that could arise by incorporating locationdependent variables in our model. For example, restaurants collocated in a shopping mall could exhibit correlated behavior because of their shared location. Our methodology precludes these issues.
We report our results in Table 5 . The inclusion of w it does not significantly alter our estimates of the remaining coefficients (as reported in Tables 3 & 4) , and hence we omit them from this table for simplicity of presentation.
Our first specification estimates the effect of competition on 1-star review fraud using a Gaussian kernel with bandwidth 1km. Using this particular bandwidth, the weight of a restaurant half a kilometer away is approximately 0.6 times the weight of restaurant in exactly the same location, while the weight of any restaurant at a distance of at least 3km becomes negligibly small. Several interesting patterns emerge. First, we find that increased competition from same-type independent restaurants is associated with increased negative review fraud. By contrast, the effect of increased competition by different food-type independent restaurants is statistically insignificant. In other words, in line with the findings of Auty (1992) , our results suggest that restaurants compete for reputation on the basis of both location and the type of food they serve. This is in contrast to the results Mayzlin et al. (2012) who find that hotels compete with their neighbors, but not on the basis of their quality-tiers. While this inconsistency is likely due to differences between the two industries, we can not reject a methodological explanation since Mayzlin et al. (2012) work in a cross-section setting. Similarly to Mayzlin et al. (2012) , we find that, regardless of food type, increased competition by chains has a moderating effect on negative review fraud.
To assess the robustness of our results to kernel choice, we estimate the same model using a
Uniform kernel with a 1km bandwidth. Our results, shown in the second column of Table 5 , remain largely unchanged. Another set of robustness checks with a bandwidth of 0.5km, shown in Table 6, did not yield substantially different outcomes.
In our final set of specifications, reported in the third and fourth columns Table 5 , we test the effect of competition on positive review fraud. Unlike negative fraud, we find no statistically significant relationship between competition intensity and positive fraud regardless of food-type, proximity, or chain affiliation. As before, these results are robust to kernel and bandwidth choice.
Conclusion and Future Work
Crowdsourced reviews have emerged as an important source of information in consumer decision making. Fake reviews threaten the credibility of this information. A lot remains to be learned about the scope of review fraud across difference domains, the incentives behind it, and how to prevent it. In this paper, we contribute to a small literature investigating a business' incentives to engage in in review fraud, and a larger literature on the association between reputation and incentives.
We set forth a methodology to empirically identify the incidence of review fraud when only an imperfect indicator of fake reviews is available. We apply this methodology to a dataset we assembled from Yelp containing the complete set of reviews for Boston restaurants with the purpose of estimating the incentives behind review fraud. Our results suggest that positive review fraud is primarily driven by changes in restaurants' own reputations, while changes in competition are the main determinant of negative review fraud.
We also evaluate the role a business' offline reputation plays in review fraud. We find that chain restaurants, which generally invest considerable more resources in brand-building and advertising than independent ones, engage in less review fraud. This result points to an interesting extension of our work: with access to historical Yelp-advertiser records, we could evaluate whether Yelp advertising and review fraud, both forms of reputation management, are substitutes or complements of each other. We hypothesize that firms with more established reputations are more likely to advertise, and less likely to engage in review fraud.
Another relationship we wish to investigate in more depth is that between restaurants engaging their reviewers on Yelp (and, more broadly on social media), and review fraud. While our current results indicate that restaurants which claim their Yelp listings tend to engage in more review fraud, we expect the relationship to be more nuanced. Specifically, we conjecture that restaurants that monitor, and honestly respond to customer complaints -one of the services Yelp provides to businesses that claim their listings -are less likely to engage in review fraud. If our hypothesis were true, it would raise the question of whether restaurants derive greater utility from genuinely engaging customers than gaming the review system. Unfortunately, since our dataset currently lacks an indicator of which reviews have been responded to, we are not able to test this hypothesis.
Finally, our results are relevant for content aggregators looking to improve content quality.
A growing computer science literature has developed methods to identify fake reviews, but this literature largely abstracts away from a business' incentives. Our work points towards specific features of the review environment that can be incorporated in fake review detection systems. It
remains an interesting open question, whether the performance of detection algorithms can be improved by taking these features into account. 
The dependent variable for all models is a binary indicator of whether a specific review was filtered. All models include business fixed effects. Cluster-robust t-statistics (at the individual business level) are shown in parentheses. Significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. it , i.e., the number of 5-star filtered reviews per month for each business. Cluster-robust t-statistics (at the individual business level) are shown in parentheses. All specifications contain controls for various review attributes which are not shown. The number of observations N is smaller than that reported in Table 2 since lag variables are included. Significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Note: The dependent variable for all models is F 1 it , i.e., the number of 1-star filtered reviews per month for each business. Cluster-robust t-statistics (at the individual business level) are shown in parentheses. All specifications contain controls for various review attributes which are not shown. The number of observations N is smaller than that reported in Table 2 since lag variables are included. Significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Note: The dependent variable is F k it , i.e., the number of k-star filtered reviews per month for each business (for k = 1, 5). Cluster-robust t-statistics (at the individual business level) are shown in parentheses. Significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Note: The dependent variable is F k it , i.e., the number of k-star filtered reviews per month for each business (for k = 1, 5). Cluster-robust t-statistics (at the individual business level) are shown in parentheses. Significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
